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DRAFT: The Linguistic Approach to Spinoza’s Attributes 
Abstract 
Many Spinoza scholars in the last century have attempted to understand the metaphysics of the attributes – Thought and 
Extension – by first understanding the semantics of the terms we use to talk and think about them – ‘Thought’ and 
‘Extension’. This is the linguistic approach to Spinoza’s attributes. This approach has come in two variants: the semantic 
account says that we express something different when we talk or think in terms of ‘Thought’ rather than ‘Extension’. 
The alternative is the syntactic account, which says that ‘Thought’-talk and ‘Extension’-talk are merely distinct languages 
with the same expressive power. In this paper I develop and defend the semantic account, responding to a recent and 
pressing objection: that it commits Spinoza to property pluralism, a view that is in tension with his monism. To 
undermine this objection, I distinguish between two kinds of property pluralism: a robust pluralism, of sparse (or 
metaphysically significant) properties, and a pluralism of merely abundant properties. I then argue that only the former is 
problematic for Spinoza, yet the semantic account is only committed to the latter. Finally, I use the model of dimension 
terms in analytic geometry (like ‘x-axis’ and ‘y-axis’) to show that a semantic account can avoid robust property pluralism 
while still maintaining (as Spinoza does in Ethics 1D6) that how many attributes a substance has is a metaphysically significant 
fact about that substance – something the syntactic view cannot account for. 
Introduction 
Following Descartes, Spinoza distinguishes between two fundamentally distinct attributes that a 
substance can have: Thought and Extension. This marks the familiar philosophical distinction between 
the mental and the physical. But unlike Descartes, Spinoza does not believe a substance can only 
have one attribute.1 On the most prominent reading of Spinoza’s Ethics, his view is that there is only 
a single substance – God, or Nature – that has infinitely many attributes, of which Thought and 
Extension are only two.2 Spinoza’s attributes are clearly an important component of his metaphysics, 
but the exact place of attributes in Spinoza’s ontology has long been a matter of dispute among 
scholars. 
 
1 Descartes (1985), 210-11. 
2 Marshall (2009) is a notable exception, arguing that each attribute is a distinct substance. Some interpreters 
(Bennet (1984), Kline and Mawr (1977)) have argued that Thought and Extension are the only two attributes; 
I believe Melamed (2018) provides a compelling refutation of that view, upholding the standard reading on 
which there are infinitely many distinct attributes. 
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 One line of interpretation - which I’ll call the linguistic approach to the attributes - holds that 
the key to understanding the metaphysical role of the attributes is to first understand the semantic 
content of the terms with which we talk and think about the attributes.3 The traditional form of the 
linguistic interpretation says that Extension-terms and Thought-terms constitute two semantically 
distinct vocabularies with which we talk about the one substance. Yet some linguistic interpreters4 
maintain that we should instead think of these vocabularies as semantically identical: they are merely 
distinct languages with the same expressive power. I’ll call these the semantic and syntactic variants of 
the linguistic interpretation. The key disagreement is that on the syntactic view, there is no difference 
in meaning when we talk in terms of Extension rather than Thought – it is only the non-semantic 
features of these terms (like how the terms sound, or how they are conjugated) that differentiates the 
two vocabularies. 
 In this paper, I develop and defend the traditional semantic account as the better linguistic 
interpretation of Spinoza’s attributes. Attribute-terms like ‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’ differ in their 
semantic content: what we express is different when we talk in terms of Extension rather than 
Thought. I introduce the linguistic interpretation and distinguish its two variants in section I. In 
section II, I present what I take to be the main problem with each of these variants. The problem 
for the syntactic account is that if attribute-vocabularies are merely syntactically distinct from each 
other, then how many different types of attribute-terms there are for talking about a substance should 
 
3 Some scholars have contrasted the linguistic approach with other traditional interpretations of the attributes, 
often called the subjective and objective interpretations. These interpretations take opposing sides on the question 
of realism about the attributes. The subjectivists are anti-realists, thinking the attributes are artefacts of human 
cognition; the objectivists are realists, thinking the attributes correspond to real divisions in reality. I won’t 
discuss these views, since I think the linguistic approach can be used in either a realist or anti-realist reading 
of the attributes. Rather, I take any reading of the attributes that focuses on a semantic analysis of attribute-
terms to belong in the linguistic category, regardless of what the metaphysical status of the attributes turns 
out to be on such a reading. For accounts of the debate between objective and subjective readings, see Gram 
(1968), Jarrett (1977), Koistinen (1996), Shein (2009), and Driggers (2020). 
4 Most notably Jones (1969) and Lin (2019). 
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imply no difference in the metaphysics of that substance. Yet the central property Spinoza uses to 
define God – being absolutely infinite5 – involves having infinitely many attributes. The problem for the 
semantic account is that it entails property pluralism, a view that is in tension with Spinoza’s 
monism. I argue in section III that we can salvage the semantic account from property pluralism by 
distinguishing between two kinds of pluralisms: pluralism of sparse (or metaphysically significant) 
properties, and pluralism of merely abundant properties. The semantic account can avoid property 
pluralism so long as the different attribute-vocabularies differ only in the non-sparse properties they 
include (properties like being represented as Thinking). In section IV, I use the model of dimension terms in 
analytic geometry, like ‘x-axis’ and ‘y-axis’, to show how such a modification of the semantic account 
can accommodate Spinoza’s definition of absolute infinity, which the syntactic account cannot do.  
 
Section I: The linguistic approach to the attributes 
Spinoza defines attribute as “what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence” 
(Ethics 1D46).7 The notion of attribute then goes on to play a significant role in Spinoza’s 
metaphysics. He defines God – which he will prove is the only substance in 1P14 – as “a being 
absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one 
expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (1D6). As indicated by the inclusion of ‘what the intellect 
perceives’ in 1D4, Spinoza thinks attributes play a significant role in our cognitive economy. He 
 
5 In addition to using italics for emphasis and to introduce new terms, I use italics when referring to a 
property, as in the above.  
6 All citations to the Ethics are to the Curley (1994) edition, and will be in the above format: starting with the 
book number and ending with the number of the relevant definition (‘D’), axiom (‘A’), or proposition (‘P’). 
Scholia and correlates of propositions will be denoted by adding an ‘S’ or a ‘C’ behind the proposition 
number, respectively. 
7 Jarrett (1977) points out that for much of the 20th Century, the scholarly debate around this passage 
centered around whether the Latin tanquam should be translated as ‘as’ or ‘as if’; on the second, Spinoza 
would be claiming that the intellect incorrectly perceives these attributes as constitutive of the essence of 
substance. This debate seems to have gone out of fashion in recent decades; I take Melamed (2018) to make 
the best case that the attributes really do constitute the essence of substance.  
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claims that “each being must be conceived under some attribute” (IP10S), which applies to both 
substances and their modes. We can say the substance is a Thinking thing (when conceived under 
the attribute of Thought) and an Extended thing (when conceived under the attribute of Extension).  
He also argues there is a conceptual barrier between these attributes, concluding that each 
must be conceived through itself at 1P10.8 This has serious implications for Spinoza, as this 
conceptual barrier then justifies several controversial doctrines that are at the center of puzzles 
about the attributes. For example, because of this conceptual barrier, Spinoza concludes that 
whether God can be said to be the cause of some mode depends on which attribute God is 
considered under:  
the modes of each attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under 
the attribute of which they are modes, and not insofar as he is considered under any other 
attribute (2P6). 
From this proposition, Spinoza is then able to prove that “the body cannot determine the mind to 
thinking, and the mind cannot determine the body to motion, to rest, or to anything else” (3P2). 
This is especially puzzling given that Spinoza thinks that “the mind and the body are one and the 
same thing” (3P2S). This is because of Spinoza’s famous parallelism: every mode of an attribute is 
identical to a mode of each other attribute.9 My body is identical to the idea of my body; and 
likewise every other mode of Extension is identical to its idea. These ideas are Thinking things, 
 
8 I borrow the term ‘conceptual barrier’ from Della Rocca (1996). This barrier is a primary motivation for 
Marshall (2009)’s argument that each attribute must be its own substance, based on Spinoza’s definition of 
substance as “what is in itself and conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the 
concept of another thing, from which it must be formed” (1D3).  
9 Melamed (2013) calls this the ‘inter-attribute parallelism’, to distinguish it from the separate parallelism of 
ideas and their objects. Melamed argues that this parallelism follows from 1P16, though it is not made explicit 
until Book II of the Ethics. 
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meaning they cannot cause anything Extended (per 3P2); yet they are identical to Extended things, 
which have Extended effects. 
There is no agreed upon solution among Spinoza scholars for the relation between attribute 
and substance, nor mind and body. In attempting to resolve these puzzles, many interpreters have 
taken notice of the prevalence of representational vocabulary (like ‘consider’ in 2P6; ‘perceive’ in 
1D4; ‘conceive’ in 1P10S) in these quotes.10 Attribute-terms (like ‘Thought’, ‘Extension’, ‘mind’, 
‘body’) seem to play an important role in our representations of the world, suggesting that these 
metaphysical puzzles might be solved by attending to their semantics. 
What are these attribute-terms, and why should it be so important to understand their 
semantics in order to understand the metaphysics of attributes? We can think of these as words – 
like ‘Extension’, ‘mind’, ‘idea’ – that we use to signify that we are considering our referent as a 
Thinking thing or as an Extended thing. On Spinoza’s view, our cognitive representations use a similar 
linguistic structure, so that we can think of the concept IDEA as the mentalistic equivalent of the 
word ‘idea’. I’ll stick to single quotes (‘) throughout, intending to include both concepts and words 
when I talk about terms.11 Attribute-terms fall into different vocabularies: they are grouped together as 
Extension-terms or Thought-terms, and infinitely many other categories corresponding to each of 
the infinitely many attributes. These are the terms we use when we consider something under or 
through an attribute: ‘my mind’ is what I use to refer to myself when I conceive of myself as a 
Thinking thing, and ‘my body’ is how I refer to myself when conceived under the attribute of 
Extension.  
 
10 For some examples, take Wolfson (1934); Wilson (1975); Shein (2009); Lin (2019). 
11 I take these terms to be individuated both by their syntactic and semantic features (so syntactically identical 
but semantically distinct terms are numerically distinct).  
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Each term has a syntactic structure: some symbol for the written term, or a series of sounds 
when spoken. In the case of mental language, we can think of this syntactic structure as constituted 
by the phenomenal experience of thinking of something through these terms. Further, each term has 
a semantic content. Following the Fregean tradition, we can think of this content as divided into two 
components: a reference and a sense. The reference of a term is some entity in the world that is 
picked out by the term; in Spinoza’s terminology, this would be the object of the term (for example, 
see 2D4). Each of these terms also has some meaning in addition to its referent, and this is its sense. 
The sense of an attribute-term is whatever meaningful content is expressed about the referent when 
this term is used. For simplicity, I’ll assume a term’s sense can be fully accounted for in terms of the 
properties that it includes (more on properties in Section III).12  
Each referring term in each attribute-vocabulary has a counterpart in each other vocabulary.13 
The counterpart of ‘my hand’ (Extension-vocabulary) is ‘the idea of my hand’ (Thought-vocabulary). 
The core of the linguistic interpretation is that these counterpart attribute-terms always co-refer: ‘my 
hand’ will always refer to the same entity as ‘the idea of my hand’.14 In sections II-IV, I consider the 
question of whether these counterpart attribute-terms have identical semantic content, as well the 
same referent. Do I say something different about this thing by calling it a ‘hand’ rather than an ‘idea 
of a hand’? Before we can get to that, however, it is important to motivate the linguistic approach in 
 
12 I’ll sometimes say a term includes property x; by this I mean that the term’s sense includes that property. 
13 This is the linguistic equivalent of Spinoza’s metaphysical parallelism doctrine: that each mode is a mode of 
every attribute, so that the mode of Extension that is my hand is identical to the mode of Thought that is the 
idea of my hand. See Melamed (2013) for a thorough discussion of this parallelism doctrine (as well as a 
separate but related parallelism between ideas and their objects).  
14 I will leave aside consideration of certain Thought-terms that don’t seem to have any counterpart. These 
are terms like ‘the idea of the idea of my hand’. Spinoza’s view in 2P21S seems to be that there is an infinite 
hierarchy of modes of Thought that has no counterpart in other attributes. Yet he also claims that all the 
members of this hierarchy are identical (i.e., that the idea of x is identical to the idea of the idea of x, and so 
on). This is a puzzling view that requires its own explanation. But whatever that explanation is, it must 
accommodate Spinoza’s more central doctrine that each mode of Thought has a unique counterpart mode in 
Extension, and in every other attribute. 
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general. Why the focus on semantics and terms in the first place, when what we want to understand 
is the metaphysics of the attributes? 
As I see it, there are three core pieces of motivation for the linguistic approach to the 
attributes, which I’ll discuss in the next three subsections: (i) simplicity of the one substance; (ii) 
intensionality in Spinoza’s mind-body identity thesis; and (iii) Spinoza’s emphasis on language when 
clarifying the notion of attribute in a letter to his friend De Vries. I discuss these in turn in sections 
I.1-3. In doing so, I motivate the traditional variant of the linguistic approach, which I call the 




Spinoza argues in the first book of the Ethics that there can only be one substance: God, or Nature 
(1P14). It is intuitive to think that substance monism should come together with something like 
essence monism. But given the definitions of attribute and of God, the one substance seems to have an 
essence consisting of many distinct and incompatible components: the essence is both Thinking and 
Extended, and has infinitely many more components for each other attribute.15 These attributes are 
conceptually independent and irreducible: each “must be conceived through itself” (1P10). Yet 
Spinoza himself claims in his Short Treatise on Man, God and His Wellbeing that God is “a simple 
being”.16 A substance with an essence that is both irreducibly Extended and irreducibly Thinking 
 
15 This is suggested, for example, by Spinoza’s claim that each attribute “expresses an eternal and infinite 
essence” (1D6). 
16 Spinoza (1985), 70. Wolfson (1934) argues that Spinoza should be interpreted in the tradition of medieval 
Jewish rationalism, which held God’s simplicity as a central metaphysical assumption. Shein (2009) calls this 
the Simplicity Requirement, and claims it is the central motivator for subjectivist (or anti-realist) interpretations 
of the attributes. 
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seems like a complex entity. If the attributes are numerically distinct from each other, we need an 
explanation for how either (i) a simple substance can have a complex essence, or (ii) a substance can 
have many irreducibly distinct attributes (which constitute its essence) without having a complex 
essence. The central tension is between monism and pluralism, both of which Spinoza wants to 
maintain in a central position in his ontology: it seems like he wants to be a monist about substance, 
yet maintain some kind of pluralism in the essence of that substance.  
 It isn’t impossible to answer this problem with strictly metaphysical (rather than semantic) 
considerations.17 But this tension is one place where attending to the semantics of attribute-terms 
can help us interpret the Ethics. The promise of focusing on semantics is that, in some sense, this 
apparent pluralism can be pushed onto our expressions about the essence of the one substance, and 
eliminated from the metaphysics of that essence.18 We already know we have a plurality of 
vocabularies with which we can talk about the substance. Perhaps this plurality can help us account 
for the apparent ‘pluralism’ in the essence of substance, without imputing a metaphysical pluralism 
to this essence. We’ll see in the following subsection how this general strategy can be implemented 
through the application of certain notions from the 20th century literature on Frege’s puzzle. 
 
I.2 Intensionality  
Spinoza is clear that the identity holding between the Thinking thing and the Extended thing does 
not only apply to the one substance, but also to every mode of that substance. Spinoza holds that, 
 
17 This is what I take both Melamed (2013, 2018) and Garrett (2018a) to be attempting when they characterize 
the attributes as “aspects” or “manners of existing” of the one substance, respectively. Both of these are 
attempts to explain how the substance can have a single essence, which nevertheless involves some plurality 
(either a plurality of aspects for Melamed, or a plurality of manners of existence for Garrett).  
18 In this (and other ways), the linguistic approach has many of the same motivations as the anti-realist 
subjective account, best characterized by Wolfson (1934). But, as we shall see further on, the linguistic approach 
is not committed to anti-realist reading of the attributes. 
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for example, my mind is identical to my body: they are “one and the same thing” (3P2S). Yet not 
every predicate that is truly applied to my body can also be applied to my mind. Although ‘my mind’ 
and ‘my body’ refer to the same entity, these two words cannot be substituted for each other salva 
veritate. In particular, Spinoza is clear that such substitutions fail in causal contexts: God is a cause of 
an idea insofar as he is considered as a Thinking thing, but not insofar as he is considered under any other 
attribute (2P6). 
 This failure of substitution of co-referring terms in certain contexts is reminiscent of the 20th 
century debate surrounding Frege’s puzzle.19 The classic case starts from the fact that the terms ‘the 
morning star’ and ‘the evening star’ have both long been used to refer to Venus. Yet the people 
using these terms, until fairly recently, did not know that both referred to the same entity. Even 
though these two terms co-refer, it does not follow from ‘X believes the morning star is F’ that ‘X 
believes the evening star is F’. Belief-report contexts are the paradigm case of sentences in which it 
is not truth-preserving to substitute co-referring terms.   
Some core notions arising out of the ensuing debate can help us interpret Spinoza. Frege’s 
own contribution includes the suggestion that the terms that give rise to this puzzle have the same 
reference but different ‘senses’. This is what allows them to function as guises or modes of presentation 
through which someone can believe something about an entity under one description, but not 
another. I take two terms to be guises for the same entity if they are co-referring, but cannot be 
substituted salva veritate in opaque contexts. Two terms are semantic guises if they co-refer but have 
different senses; they are syntactic guises if they co-refer and have the same sense. Another important 
notion associated with this puzzle is that certain contexts are opaque, meaning they are sentences in 
which it is not truth-preserving to substitute co-referring terms. Belief reports are the paradigm case 
 
19 Frege (1948). 
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of these contexts. Finally, the notion of intensionality is importantly connected to opacity: it is the 
property of a term that explains its functioning as a guise in opaque contexts. 
 Terminology from Frege’s puzzle has been applied as part of the linguistic approach to the 
attributes since the latter half of the 20th Century. In describing the linguistic interpretation of the 
attributes, Gram (1968) characterizes it as the view that “substance can be denoted by expressions 
which have different senses”. Wilson (1975) claims that understanding Spinoza’s monism would 
require “whacking one’s way through a thicket of intensionality of which only the bare outlines have 
so far been discerned.” In his 1996 Representation and the Mind-body Problem in Spinoza, Della Rocca 
systematically deploys the notions of opacity and intensionality to explain Spinoza’s monism. He 
focuses primarily on the mind-body problem, rather than on the relation between attribute and 
substance in general. The core of his analysis exploits the similarity between issues connected to 
Frege’s puzzle and tensions in Spinoza’s monism. Della Rocca’s view is that causal contexts are 
always opaque, so that in statements of the form ‘X causes Y’, ‘X’ cannot be substituted for a co-
referring term salva veritate.20  
Della Rocca’s case is interesting, since he takes significant pains to incorporate these 
considerations in a strictly metaphysical (rather than linguistic) way. Instead of attributing 
intensionality to the terms used for talking about the substance, he introduces the concept of an 
intensional property. These are meant to be properties that generate intensional contexts: for example, 
being the cause of x is an intensional property on Della Rocca’s view.21 So Della Rocca does not 
advocate for a linguistic interpretation, but rather a strictly metaphysical interpretation that takes 
 
20 Della Rocca (1996), especially Ch. 7.  
21 Della Rocca, 128-9. Garrett (2018a, 268-9) and Marshall (2009, 907) both criticize this aspect of Della 
Rocca’s account. They argue that it is not at all clear how we could translate the semantic notion of an 
intensional context to a purely metaphysical notion of an intensional property.  
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philosophical inspiration from the debates about Frege’s puzzle in 20th Century philosophy of 
language. 
 We need not follow Della Rocca’s translation from semantic notions to metaphysical ones. 
In keeping with the linguistic approach, we can attribute intensionality to the terms we use to talk 
about the substance, rather than the properties of the substance (which is, of course, the more 
natural way to apply the linguistic notion of intensionality). The most natural way to do this is to 
hold, on analogy with ‘the evening star’ and ‘the morning star’, that attribute-term counterparts like 
‘my body’ and ‘my mind’ are co-referring terms with different semantic content. We can also hold 
that all attribute-terms – those we use when ‘considering’ something as Thinking or Extended – are 
intensional. Finally, all contexts of causal explanation – among others22 – are opaque with respect to 
attribute-terms. This is the core of what I call the semantic account, a variant of the linguistic approach 
that maintains that attribute-term counterparts co-refer, and function as semantically distinct modes 
of presentation of their referent.23  
 
I.3 Spinoza’s letter to De Vries 
The idea that attribute-term counterparts share a referent but have different meaning also draws 
support from some of Spinoza’s own claims about the attributes outside of the Ethics.24 When asked 
to clarify the relation between attribute and substance by De Vries, Spinoza reframes this question, 
 
22 Spinoza says that every time we conceive a being, we do so through some attribute (1P10S). Though this 
needs to be made precise, it seems to suggest that most contexts involving quantification will be opaque. But 
some are clearly not: for example, when Spinoza says that the mind and body are “one and the same thing” 
(3PS) he is clearly taking this sentence not to be an opaque context. According to Garrett, this is because it is 
only contexts involving the ‘is’ of predication that can be opaque, while contexts with the ‘is’ of identity are 
transparent.  
23 For a recent proponent of the semantic account, see Shein (2009). 
24 It is somewhat uncomfortable for the linguistic approach that Spinoza does not include any claims like 
these in the Ethics itself.  
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saying De Vries is asking him to explain “how one and the same thing can be designated by two 
names.”25 His first example is ‘Jacob’ and ‘Israel’, two names for the Biblical figure, given to him for 
different acts he performed in his life. The second is ‘flat’ and ‘white’, two terms he claims we use 
for flat surfaces, although ‘white’ is used “in relation to a man looking at the flat [surface].”26 It isn’t 
difficult to see how this answer lends support to the idea that the semantics of attribute-terms is key 
to understanding the metaphysics of attributes. Spinoza himself seems to think of these as cases of 
co-referring terms with different semantic content, making it clear why the semantic account is prima 
facie the best way to think about attribute-terms. Given Spinoza’s letter and the potential for a focus 
on attribute-terms to solve interpretive problems, there is enough evidence to motivate the linguistic 
approach to the attributes. 
 
I.4 The syntactic account 
Some interpreters have proposed an alternative to the traditional version of the linguistic approach.27 
On this alternative reading, attribute-terms differ from each other only syntactically, like words from 
different languages that have the same meaning but different non-semantic properties. These non-
semantic properties include how they are pronounced, how they are conjugated, or what kinds of 
visible marks are used to write them. Since these terms include elements of our mental language as 
well, what the experience of thinking about them is like is another non-semantic feature that differentiates 
 
25 Spinoza (1985), 195 
26 Ibid, 195-6. 
27 Jones (1969), p.204-6; Lin (2019), Ch.4. 
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these vocabularies.28 Unlike the semantic account, the syntactic view says that we don’t express 
anything different when we talk about Extended things rather than Thinking things.  
According to the syntactic view, attribute-term counterparts share all semantic properties, 
including both reference and sense. Jones (1969), the earliest proponent of this account, compares 
the difference between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ to the difference between the English word ‘city’ and the 
Greek word ‘polis’.29 Lin (2019) gives the syntactic account of the attributes a much more careful 
and considered defense against its semantic alternative. On his view, the substance has a single, 
simple essence, and the attributes are nothing other than this one essence under a plurality of 
syntactically distinct modes of presentation.30 He references Kripke (1978)’s A Puzzle about Belief, 
where Kripke shows that opaque contexts can lead to failures of substitutivity of co-referring terms 
even when these terms have the same semantic content. The classic example is ‘London’ and 
‘Londres’; in the context of a belief-report, these cannot be substituted salva veritate. A bilingual 
believer (like Kripke’s Pierre) might believe a French sentence like ‘Londres est jolie’ while rejecting 
its English equivalent ‘London is pretty.’ Following this example, Lin characterizes attribute-
vocabularies as merely syntactically distinct languages with identical expressive power.  
Both of their accounts center on the simplicity of the substance. The substance is one and 
undifferentiated: there is no plurality in its essence corresponding to the plurality of attributes. On 
 
28 Lin (2019) suggests that it is precisely these kinds of phenomenal properties that distinguish the different 
attribute-vocabularies. Lin doesn’t provide much evidence for this, but it is notable that this could still be true 
under the semantic account, since that account can still maintain that attribute-terms are syntactically distinct. 
29 Gram (1968) objects to Jones’ view, claiming in a footnote that on this account, then “the relation between 
substance and attribute will be that of identy [sic] – from which it follows that to say a substance has a certain 
attribute is to say nothing more than that a substance is identical with itself” (Gram, p.227, fn. 7). My main 
objection to the syntactic account in Section II.1 shares the core of Gram’s: that merely syntactic guises do 
not entail a metaphysical difference in their referent, so that nothing metaphysically significant is required of a 
substance that is talked about with these different vocabularies. 
30 Lin (2019), 78. 
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this view, the plurality of attributes is really nothing more than a plurality of languages for talking 
and thinking about the essence of the substance. Recall my discussion in Section I.1 of the tension 
between pluralism and monism that fuels the linguistic approach. The substance is one, yet we talk 
about its essence as if it were many. Fulfilling the initial promise of the linguistic approach, the 
syntactic view pushes pluralism entirely out of the metaphysics of substance, and onto the linguistic 
vehicles with which we talk and think about substance. The semantic account can never achieve 
such a clear commitment to the simplicity of substance. Lin makes this clear by characterizing the 
difference between semantic and syntactic guises in the following way: semantically distinct 
attribute-terms imply “a metaphysical difference in the world”;31 merely syntactically distinct terms 
imply no such difference. It is not possible for the semantic account to maintain that the substance 
is undifferentiated with respect to the attributes. This is the main positive draw of the syntactic view. 
 
II. Problems for both linguistic accounts 
In this section, I raise what I see as the primary problem for each of the two variants of the linguistic 
approach. These are by no means the only possible objections to these views, but I think they are 
the most pressing.  
 
II.1 Absolute infinity and the syntactic account 
Lin considers and answers several objections to the syntactic view in his chapter about the 
attributes.32 Here I present a new objection: that the syntactic account cannot explain Spinoza’s 
definition of God at Ethics 1D6. Spinoza defines God in the following way at the start of the Ethics: 
 
31 Lin, 101. 
32 Lin (2019), 91-2. 
 15 
 By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of 
 attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence. (1D6; emphasis 
 added). 
Spinoza then clarifies the notion of absolute infinity by comparing it to the notion of infinity-in-its-
kind, confirming that the former is characterized primarily by the number of attributes a being 
consists in. In his explanation for 1D6, Spinoza says: 
I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind; for if something is only infinite in its 
 own kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it… but if something is absolutely infinite, 
 whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence. (1D6Exp.) 
Spinoza defines ‘infinite in its own kind’ as something that cannot “be limited by another of the 
same nature” (E1D2). It is quite reasonable to interpret him as claiming that having an infinite nature 
or essence (which Spinoza uses interchangeably) is constitutive of being infinite in one’s own kind. But 
then Spinoza differentiates between that which is merely infinite in its kind and that which is absolutely 
infinite. He draws this distinction, it seems, only on the basis of whether this entity has infinitely 
many attributes.  
This should immediately suggest a problem for the syntactic interpretation. Any reader of 
1D6 must assume that by ‘absolutely infinite being’ Spinoza has in mind a robust metaphysical 
notion of absolute infinity. God, the centerpiece of Spinoza’s metaphysics, is individuated by this 
property. Spinoza then tells us precisely what he has in mind with this phrase: a being with 
infinitely33 many attributes, each one expressing infinite essence. Yet on the syntactic view, 
 
33 Spinoza notoriously uses the word ‘infinite’ in a distinct way from our usage. By it he means ‘unlimited’ or 
‘unbounded’; he does not seem to have considered that some bounded things can also be infinite 
(anachronistically: the real number line between 0 and 1 is bounded but uncountably infinite). I follow 
Spinoza’s usage here. 
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consisting of an infinity of attributes simply means having a single essence that can be referred to in 
infinitely many languages (i.e., infinitely many semantically identical attribute-vocabularies).34  
To be more precise: Spinoza is committed to the view that a substance is absolutely infinite iff it 
has infinitely many attributes. One might wonder whether the last clause of 1D6 undermines this 
biconditional. Spinoza says God is a substance with infinitely many attributes, each of which expresses an 
infinite essence. This suggests there is not a biconditional relation between having infinitely many 
attributes and being absolutely infinite. Perhaps it is not enough for a being to have infinitely many 
attributes; it must also be the case that each of these attributes expresses an infinite essence. But this 
is a dead end. Every attribute necessarily expresses infinite essence, making the second clause trivial. 
Spinoza defines being infinite in its own kind (the most reasonable reading of an attribute 
‘expressing infinite essence’) as a being that cannot “be limited by another of the same nature” 
(1D2). In his proof that every substance must be infinite (1P8), Spinoza argues that even a substance 
with a single attribute must be infinite in its own kind, because it would otherwise be limited by 
another substance of the same attribute, which he proved is impossible in 1P5. Spinoza is clearly 
saying that the only way for an attribute to express a merely finite essence is for there to be another 
substance with the same attribute, which is impossible. It follows that every attribute expresses 
infinite essence according to Spinoza. The only non-trivial criterion for being absolutely infinite is 
 
34 Lin does not address E1D6 directly, but he has a response to an apparently similar objection on the basis of 
E1P9. There, Spinoza claims that the more “reality or being” a thing has, the more attributes it has (he takes 
this to follow immediately from E1D4, the definition of attribute). Lin considers the following objection: how 
can it follow from having more reality that one has more attributes, if attributes are mere syntactic guises? His 
answer is that for Spinoza, an entity having more reality entails that more things follow from its essence. So 
an entity with infinite reality is an entity from which “every possible thing follows”.34 Thus if G is a possible 
type of syntactic guise for God’s essence, it follows that G is an actual type of syntactic guise for God’s 
essence, since God’s essence is infinitely real. Putting aside whether this response succeeds in explaining 1P9, 
it fails to address the issue of 1D6. This is because Lin’s response only accounts for a one-way entailment 
from higher degree-of-reality to greater number-of-attributes, while E1D6 asserts a one-one correlation 
between having infinite attributes and being absolutely infinite.  
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having infinitely many attributes. A substance is absolutely infinite iff it has infinitely many 
attributes.  
On the syntactic account, this is equivalent to the claim that a substance is absolutely infinite 
iff there are infinitely many semantically identical languages that refer to it. What notion of absolute 
infinity does that give us? There doesn’t seem to be a good reason why it should be so important to 
the definition of God that he can be cognized in infinitely many languages. Lin’s characterization of 
the difference between the semantic and syntactic views can help us see the problem: distinct 
semantic guises for the same entity imply a “metaphysical difference” in the entity; distinct syntactic 
guises for the same entity do not. The fact that there are infinitely many languages that can be used 
to say truths about a substance cannot entail anything metaphysically significant about that 
substance.  
This is the central35 problem for the syntactic account: it is clear from Spinoza’s definition of 
God at 1D6 that how many attributes a substance has is a metaphysically significant fact about that 
substance. It is hard to see how this could be true on the syntactic interpretation. This is a problem, 
since Spinoza claims that there is “nothing clearer than that a being absolutely infinite must be 
defined (as we taught in D6) as a being that consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a 
certain eternal and infinite essence” (1P10S). In Section IV, I return to this problem and show how 




35 There are other problems I don’t address here. For example: if ‘mind’ and ‘body’ differ only syntactically, 
then what about the Spanish words ‘mente’ and ‘cuerpo’? These also have the same semantic content and 
reference as ‘mind’ and ‘body’, and differ only syntactically from them. That would suggest that ‘mente’ 
differs from ‘mind’ in exactly the same way as ‘body’ does. It’s not clear that Lin’s view has an easy way to 
explain why there are not two attributes for every natural language, rather than only two in total across all natural 
languages. 
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II.2 Property pluralism and the semantic account 
The most powerful and careful criticism of the semantic view comes from Lin, the most recent 
proponent of the syntactic account.36 Lin has one primary objection against the semantic account.37 
He argues that the semantic account entails property pluralism, the view that there are distinct kinds 
of properties corresponding to the attributes of Thought and Extension (and the rest). He starts by 
claiming that if attribute-term counterparts are distinguished semantically, then there must be some 
property included in the sense of ‘Thought’ that is not included in the sense of ‘Extension’. He 
infers from this that there must be a unique property corresponding to each attribute-term but not 
to any of its counterparts. Here is his reasoning: 
If a thing satisfies two descriptions, it does so because different things are true of it. For 
example, a single star, Venus, satisfies the description is the brightest star in the morning sky in 
virtue of being the brightest star in the morning sky whereas it satisfies the brightest star in the 
evening sky in virtue of being the brightest star in the evening sky. These are different 
properties. Similarly, if there are many attributes because there are many ways in which 
substance can be described, then substance has many properties in virtue of which it satisfies 
those descriptions. For example, substance would satisfy the description is extended in virtue 
of being extended and is thinking in virtue of thinking.38 
He goes on to argue that there is no such distinguishing property or ‘mark’ of Thought for Spinoza, 
rejecting several suggestions of what this distinctive property could be.39 Finding no good candidate, 
Lin rejects the semantic account.  
 
36 There have been other criticisms which I don’t consider here; see Gram (1968). 
37 The full force of the objection, together with a defense of the syntactic account, is found in Lin (2019); 
though a more extended rejection of a ‘mark of the mental’ appears in Lin (2017). 
38 Lin, 76. 
39 Ibid, 92-99. 
 19 
Some interpreters of Spinoza have maintained that he is a property pluralist.40 Lin makes a 
good case against this position by arguing that there is no room for Thought to have different 
properties than Extension on Spinoza’s view. I’m inclined to agree with Lin that there is no place for 
these properties in Spinoza’s ontology, mainly because of Spinoza’s parallelism doctrine. Every 
mode of an attribute is identical to some mode in another attribute. So no mode can play the role of 
distinguishing one attribute from another.41 Perhaps there are ways to see Spinoza as a property 
pluralist despite Lin’s objections. But even if property pluralism can be salvaged as an interpretation 
of Spinoza, requiring property pluralism would certainly be a mark against any interpretation of 
attribute-terms.  However, we will see in the next section that we must first differentiate between 
two kinds of property pluralism: a pluralism of sparse properties, and a pluralism of merely abundant 
properties. I draw this distinction in the next section, and argue that only a pluralism of sparse 
properties is problematic for Spinoza, yet the semantic view is only committed to the weaker 
pluralism of merely abundant properties. 
 
Section III: Property pluralisms 
In this section and the next, I argue that the semantic account can overcome Lin’s objection and 
avoid a problematic property pluralist interpretation of Spinoza. To begin, we must first clarify what 
we mean when we talk about properties in Spinoza’s system. This will make it clear that we should 
differentiate between sparse and non-sparse (or merely abundant) properties. This distinction is inspired 
 
40 Like Bennett (1984). 
41 Since Spinoza excludes universals from his ontology, only particulars can play the role of these properties. 
And since substance and mode are the only particulars in the ontology, property pluralism is hard to 
accommodate. See Hübner (2016) section 2.6 for an overview of the evidence that only particulars are in 
Spinoza’s ontology. Hübner further argues that we should think of universals as included in the ontology, but 
only if we broaden our notion of Spinoza’s ontology to include mind-dependent beings of reason as well as 
mind-independent beings. For the purposes of this paper, I’m thinking of the ontology as the mind-
independent ontology, with beings of reason excluded.  
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by the similar distinction used in contemporary analytic metaphysics. That said, I am not committing 
to that precise notion, which is usually associated with the view that the sparse properties are those 
that appear in our best physical theories. Instead I use it as a way of distinguishing metaphysically 
significant or robust properties from insignificant ones.42 In this section I argue that as long as the 
senses of attribute-term counterparts include all the same sparse properties, this will not be in 
tension with Spinoza’s metaphysics. In the next section, I argue that we can use the case study of 
dimension terms in analytic geometry to see how such a semantic view can still accommodate Spinoza’s 
definition of absolute infinity, which I argued the syntactic account cannot do in Section II.1.  
 Let’s focus on the first step of Lin’s objection, which motivates the search for a mark of the 
mental. Lin says that if attribute-term counterparts have the same referent but different semantic 
content, then they must include distinct properties of that referent. What kind of properties is Lin 
concerned with here? Consider his comparison to Frege’s puzzle, where he says that the senses of 
‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ must include different properties of Venus.43 There are many 
properties that the senses of these terms could differentially include. For example, is being referred to 
with the words ‘morning star’ by English-speakers the relevant kind of property, or is there some more 
metaphysically robust notion of property at play here? Spinoza himself is not concerned with 
properties very much in the Ethics, and largely sticks to his own vocabulary of substance, attribute, 
and mode.44 Lin introduces property-talk earlier in chapter 2 of Being and Reason, where he clarifies 
that only the notion of a metaphysically robust property can help us interpret Spinoza. As an example, 
 
42 This distinction presumes that properties can be divided into two classes, the metaphysically significant and 
the metaphysically insignificant. There are many ways to think about this (for example, we can think of Sider 
(2013)’s conception, drawn from Plato, of terms that carve at the joints of reality), but it’s clear that some such 
notion is operative in Spinoza. I alternate between sparse, metaphysically significant, and robust as ways of drawing 
this distinction. 
43 Lin, 76. 
44 Spinoza does discuss propria, which he takes to be necessary properties that necessarily follow from the 
essence of a thing (Garrett 2018b, 132-3). It seems clear from Spinoza’s discussion of them (for example, at 
1P16) that only the sparse ones could be included in his ontology.  
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he points out that even though a mind resembles another mind and a body resembles another body, 
it is not true that the mind and the body share the property of resembling something. As Lin says, “not 
every predicate expresses a metaphysically robust and natural property” for Spinoza.45  
Of course, Spinoza himself did not draw a distinction in terms of types of properties; but we 
need not fear anachronism, as Spinoza was familiar with an equivalent distinction. Multiple Spinoza 
scholars46 have pointed to Suarez and Descartes’ two kinds of distinctions of reason to make a similar 
point. For both of these predecessors of Spinoza, there are two ways the mind can draw a 
distinction. The first is a distinction of reasoned (ratiocinatae) reason; this is a distinction that has a 
metaphysical correlate, a distinction that maps onto a division in reality. The second is a distinction of 
reasoning (ratiocinantis) reason, a distinction that does not correspond to a real metaphysical difference.47 
This division between two kinds of distinctions of reason, which Spinoza would certainly have been 
familiar with,48 plays the same role as my distinction between sparse and non-sparse properties. If 
semantically distinct co-referring terms must have different senses, then a distinction of reasoning 
reason would be a case where their senses differ only in the metaphysically insignificant properties 
they include. The point is that we are able to describe the world in different ways, even when these 
different descriptions don’t map onto metaphysically robust differences in what is being described. 
Some descriptive content includes robust properties, and some includes properties that are useful to 
the representing mind, but have no place in the ontology.49  
 
45 Lin 41. By ‘natural’ Lin is referring to the notion of sparse properties defended by David Lewis (for 
example, in his (1983)) and his descendants in contemporary metaphysics. I don’t follow Lin in using this 
term, though I don’t think there is a significant philosophical upshot to using ‘sparse’ instead of ‘natural’. 
46 Including Lin (2019) and Melamed (2018). 
47 Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations VII, p.18-19; Descartes, AT 4:349-50.  
48 See Melamed (2018)’s argument that there is good evidence Spinoza was familiar with this distinction, 
p.101. 
49 Both Lin and Melamed assume that if the distinction between attributes is a distinction of reasoning reason, 
then the attributes are unreal, and merely in the mind. Lin takes the antirealist side of this, thinking it is a 
distinction of reasoning reason; Melamed takes the realist side, thinking it is a distinction of reasoned reason. 
As will become clear in the next section, I think this is a false dichotomy. The fact that the senses of attribute-
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I agree with Lin that only metaphysically robust, or sparse, properties are relevant for 
Spinoza’s ontology. As a result, we should note that the semantic interpretation only commits 
Spinoza to a problematic property pluralism if it entails pluralism about sparse properties. It is not 
enough to show that under the semantic interpretation there are semantically distinct kinds of terms 
associated with Thought and Extension. It must also be shown that these distinct kinds of terms 
correspond to metaphysically robust properties that also fall into two kinds, the Extended properties 
and the Thinking properties. Lin’s argument that there is no mark of the mental for Spinoza also 
depends on the notion of sparse properties – it is only if we’re looking among the metaphysically 
significant properties in Spinoza’s system that there will be no room for a distinguishing mark of any 
attribute.50  
Once we consider this distinction, we can see that there is some wiggle room in our 
semantics relative to our metaphysics: we can have co-referring terms that differ semantically 
because they include different merely abundant properties, and thus imply no robust metaphysical 
difference in their referent. Consider our previous example of a non-sparse property, being referred to 
with the words ‘morning star’ by English-speakers. This clearly wouldn’t qualify as a sparse property of 
Venus. Yet there is still a semantic difference between a term that includes this property, and a term 
that includes the non-sparse property being referred to with the words ‘evening star’ by English-speakers.  
This means we need to be careful about how we interpret Lin’s claim that distinct semantic 
guises imply a metaphysical difference in the world. It is important to distinguish this claim from the 
 
terms differ only in non-sparse properties does not entail that the attributes are unreal or merely in the mind. 
There is room for an interpretation on which how many attributes a substance has is a metaphysically significant 
fact about that substance, even if the semantic distinction drawn between attribute-terms is a mere distinction 
of reasoning reason. The case I make in this paper could be translated into these rationalist terms; I stick with 
properties only because that is the term Lin uses to pose his objection to the semantic account. 
50 This is evident both from the fact that Lin makes sure to draw this distinction whenever he discusses 
properties in his (2019), and from the fact that he only considers sparse candidates in both his (2017) and 
(2019) discussions of the mark of the mental.  
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similar but false claim that distinct semantic guises imply a robust metaphysical difference in the 
world, that is, a difference between two sparse properties. Lin’s objection that the semantic account 
entails property pluralism also needs to be read carefully: while true, that doesn’t mean it entails what 
I’ll call robust property pluralism, the view that there are sparse Thinking properties that are different 
in kind from sparse Extended properties. It is only robust property pluralism that is problematic for 
Spinoza; a pluralism of merely abundant properties poses no problem for his system.51 
 This observation – that co-referring terms can differ semantically even if they include all the 
same sparse properties – can help us begin to address Lin’s objection. To answer it more fully, we 
need to think about what kinds of properties would qualify as sparse for Spinoza. This will allow us 
to see which properties attribute-term counterparts could differentially include without entailing 
robust property pluralism. Fully answering this question would require a developed theory of modes 
in Spinoza, which is too large a topic to fully settle here. But we can follow Lin in identifying one 
kind of property that Spinoza excludes from his ontology: relational properties.52 Spinoza claims in 
the Short Treatise that: 
Some things are in our intellect and not in Nature; so these are only our own work, and they 
help us to understand things distinctly. Among these we include all relations, which have 
reference to different things. These we call beings of reason. (Short Treatise I.X.1).53 
There is, of course, a question about the extent of Spinoza’s rejection of relational properties from 
his ontology; it’s not at all clear that all relational properties are excluded.54 But there are some clear 
 
51 One could hold the view that any kind of property pluralism is problematic, even only a pluralism of 
abundant properties. But then one would need new arguments for this conclusion, as Lin’s only apply against 
robust property pluralism. 
52 Lin (2019), 117. 
53 Translated by Curley (1985). 
54 See Morfino (2006) for a discussion of Spinoza’s views on relations. While Spinoza often discusses relations 
as mere ways the mind considers things, there are some relations that seem to have more ontological 
significance. For example, composite Extended things are individuated by relations (or ratios) between their 
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cases of relational properties that are not sparse, including properties of the form is represented as X by 
Y, which should be non-sparse on any conception of sparse properties. Certainly someone who 
claims he rejects “all relations” from his ontology should think these kinds of relational properties 
are not metaphysically significant.  
 What kinds of non-sparse properties might differentiate the semantic content of ‘Thought’ 
from that of ‘Extension’? One candidate is a pair of properties like being referred to with the word 
‘Thought’ in English and being referred to with the word ‘Extension’ in English. These are non-sparse 
properties, holding in virtue of the relation between an object and certain representations of that 
object. If these were the properties that differentiated the semantic content of ‘Thought’ from 
‘Extension’, they would not require robust property pluralism, since they do not mark a robust 
metaphysical difference in the world. These are quite similar to Spinoza’s example, in his letter to De 
Vries, of ‘flat’ and ‘white’. There he claims that the former denotes a flat surface, and the latter 
denotes a flat surface that is perceived by an observer as white.55 There is clearly a semantic difference 
between these terms, but there’s no sparse property of the flat surface picked out by one but not the 
other.56 If the distinguishing property included in the sense of ‘Thought’ (‘Extension’) were 
something like being referred to with the word ‘Thought’ (‘Extension’) in English¸ then Spinoza’s example of 
 
parts (see the ‘Physical Digression’ between E2P13S and 2P14; Garrett 2018b). Unless we think with Mátyási 
(2020) that these Extended things are themselves beings of reason, it would seem that these relational 
properties have some metaphysical importance.  
55 Spinoza (1985), 195-6. 
56 Lin argues that this could be a case of merely syntactic guises, claiming that ‘flat’ and ‘white’ differ only in 
that one presents the object in a perceptual way, and the other in a non-perceptual way (Lin 2019, p.77). Lin 
then claims that the difference between a perceptual and a non-perceptual vehicle of representation is a 
syntactic difference. But here Lin is wrong about what makes two terms semantically distinct. It might be that 
these modes of presentation are merely syntactically distinct. But if the word ‘flat’ picks out one of these 
modes of presentation and the word ‘white’ picks out the other, then these two terms have different semantic 
content. Even though ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are merely syntactically distinct, the referring phrases ‘the city 
called ‘London’’ and ‘the city called ‘Londres’’ are semantically distinct from each other, because they include 
different properties.   
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‘flat’ and ‘white’ would be a great analogy for the difference in semantic content between these 
terms.  
In a limited way, the above case resolves Lin’s objection: this is a pair of properties that 
could explain how the semantic content of attribute-term counterparts differ, without implying 
robust property pluralism. But here we need to be careful not to fall into the same problem that I 
raised in Section II for the syntactic view. Even though attribute-term counterparts should not imply 
a robust metaphysical difference in the world, Spinoza does think that the number of attributes a 
substance has is metaphysically significant. Having infinitely many attributes is what makes a 
substance absolutely infinite, and thereby identical with God. This means that there is a one-one 
correlation between the number of distinct attribute-term counterparts there are for referring to an 
entity and at least one metaphysically significant fact about that entity. Note that this fact does not 
depend on the number of these terms; but it is correlated with the number of terms. If there are 
infinitely many attribute-term counterparts that all refer to the same substance, it follows that the 
substance is absolutely infinite, which is to say it is God. If there are infinitely many attribute-term 
counterparts that all refer to the same mode, it follows that this is a mode of an absolutely infinite 
entity, which is to say it is a mode of God.57 The entailment holds in the other direction too: if a 
substance (or mode) is absolutely infinite then there are infinitely many attribute-term counterparts 
that refer to that substance (or mode).  
We can re-frame my objection from II.1 in these terms: the syntactic account cannot explain 
the correlation between the number of distinct attribute-term counterparts and a metaphysically 
significant property of their referent. Not every version of the semantic account can meet this 
challenge either. If the only difference in attribute-term counterpart semantic contents were which 
 
57 Spinoza is clear that although every mode is a mode of some attribute or another, every mode is also a 
mode of some substance or another. Which substance a mode inheres in is clearly a metaphysically significant 
fact about that mode, because inhering in substance X is a sparse property.  
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terms we use to refer to the substance, as in the example being referred to with the word ‘Thought’ 
(‘Extension’) in English, it would not be clear how the number of such attribute-terms could indicate a 
property of metaphysical significance. If the semantic account is going to fare better than the 
syntactic, then it must be shown that it is possible to accommodate this correlation on an account 
that avoids robust property pluralism. 
The twin challenges of answering Lin’s objection while accommodating the definition of 
absolute infinity can help us focus on the task for the semantic account. This account must 
somehow maintain that attribute-term counterparts differ only in the metaphysically insignificant 
properties they include, while the attributes themselves are metaphysically significant because the 
quantity of attributes a substance has determines whether it is absolutely infinite. To meet these 
challenges, attribute-terms must conform to the following four criteria: 
1. Attribute-term counterparts (‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’, ‘my mind’ and ‘my body’, etc.) 
co-refer. 
2. Each attribute-term has different semantic content from any of its counterpart attribute-
terms. 
3. Attribute-term counterparts include all the same sparse properties in their sense. 
4. There is some metaphysically significant property F and some number n such that an 
entity X has property F iff there are n attribute-terms that refer to X.58  
There seems to be a tension between criteria (3) and (4). How could there be a correlation between 
the number of terms and a sparse property if these terms attribute all the same sparse properties to 
their referent? I tackle this tension in the next subsection. Once we see how these criteria can be 
 
58 I sometimes characterize this as the claim that the number of attribute-terms is correlated with a significant 
fact about their referent. Here I am more precise, claiming there is a biconditional relation between some 
number of attribute-terms and some metaphysically significant property F. The relevant (cardinal) number is 
infinity, and the relevant property is being absolutely infinite. The point of abstracting from the particular number 
and property is that the problem would arise for the syntactic account even if these were different.  
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met, we will have significant confirmation that a semantic view without robust property pluralism 
can still accommodate the definition of absolute infinity.  
 
Section IV: dimension-terms in analytic geometry – a case study 
We’ve seen that the distinction between sparse and non-sparse properties – together with the 
distinction between property pluralism and robust property pluralism – can help us undermine Lin’s 
objection. Semantically distinct co-referring terms need not include different metaphysically 
significant properties. In this section, my aim is to show how a semantic view that avoids robust 
property pluralism in this way can still account for Spinoza’s definition of absolute infinity, which 
the syntactic view cannot accommodate. To do this, we must see how it is possible for a set of terms 
to meet criteria 1-4. I spend this section explaining how a generalized version of criteria 1-4 can be 
met by certain dimension terms in analytic geometry. These are terms like ‘x-axis’, ‘y-axis’, ‘x-
component’, etc.59 The aim of the case study is to be a proof-of-concept that criteria 1-4 can 
reasonably be met by some set of terms. I’ll lay out the case study first by defining the relevant set of 
terms, and then considering how it meets the four criteria in sections IV.1-4. The set I have in mind 
would be playing the role of a set of co-referring attribute-term counterparts (like the set {‘my 
mind’, ‘my body’}). 
By generalizing from 1-4 above, we can see that a set of terms S meets the appropriate criteria so 
long as the following holds:  
A. There is some entity X such that all members of S refer to X. 
B. No two members of S have the same semantic content. 
 
59 The relevance of this case study implies that there is a significant analogy between dimension-terms and 
attribute-terms, suggesting a parallel metaphysical analogy between spatial dimensions and Spinoza’s 
attributes. However, I do not explore this metaphysical analogy in this paper, but investigate only the 
semantic analogy between these two types of terms.  
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C. Any two members of S include all the same sparse properties in their sense. 
D. There is some metaphysically significant property F and some number n such that S’s 
cardinality is equal to n iff the referent of S’s members has property F. 
 
Now we can turn our attention to dimension-terms in analytic geometry, our case study that will 
allow us to meet these four criteria A-D. Let’s start with the simple case of a geometrical model M1 
representing a flat two-dimensional space R2. In the traditional style of Cartesian 2D models, M1 
includes two intersecting orthogonal ‘axes’. These are infinitely long straight curves that together 
allow the model to uniquely represent any point in R2 through that point’s coordinates (for example, 
the point where the lines meet is (0,0)). These coordinates are the point’s x-projection and y-
projection; each point has a unique combination of x- and y-projections, which is what makes these 
axes a pair of coordinate curves. The coordinate curves are themselves regions of this 2D space – the x-
axis is the region of the space where the y-projection of all points is 0, and vice-versa.60  
 We can also consider a second model of our space R2, called M2. M2 is another Cartesian 
model, with orthogonal axes.61 The only difference is that on M2, the region that is called ‘x-axis’ on 
M1 is called ‘y-axis’ instead, and the y-axis of M1 is the x-axis of M2. To help us keep track of these 
regions, we can introduce model-indexed axis terms like ‘x-axis1’ to refer to whichever curve is called ‘x-
axis’ in M1, and so on. This means that ‘x-axis1’ co-refers with ‘y-axis2’; and ‘y-axis1’ and ‘x-axis2’ also 
co-refer. This completes our necessary setup. 
 
60 Note that although the x-axis could itself be considered as a one-dimensional space, it is still a region of the 
2D space R2, because each of its points has a determinate y-coordinate in that space. If it were only a region 
of 1D space, there would be no fact of the matter about the value of the y-projection of any of these points.  
61 One could question whether it is possible to stipulate that M1 and M2 represent the same space. I don’t see 
why that should be a problem. Everyone can agree that for any 2D space, there are many possible models 
that represent that space but with different coordinate systems. I am simply taking two of these possible 
models, which are identical except for which curves they represent as the x-axis and y-axis.  
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We can now take the set of terms S2: {‘x-axis1’, ‘y-axis2’} as our case study. This is the set of 
all model-indexed axis-terms in our two models that refer to one of the two coordinate curves, a 
region I’ll call R. I’ll argue this set meets all of A-D, and thus serves as a proof-of-concept for the 
semantic interpretation of Spinoza’s attributes. 
There is no loss of generality by focusing on the simple 2D case (readers willing to trust this 
claim can feel free to skip to IV.1). A generalized version of this procedure can be used on a space 
Rn with any number of dimensions. In the general case, we can define our relevant set Sn by the 
following procedure. Take some n-dimensional space Rn; some set O whose members are some n 
orthogonal straight lines meeting at some one point in Rn;62 and some set T of n syntactically distinct 
symbols (which will serve as our axis-terms). We can then define the set {M1, M2,…,Mn} of all 
geometrical models of Rn that meet three criteria: i) the set of regions that serve as coordinate curves 
in the model is O; ii) the set of axis-terms in the model is T; and iii) the model differs from every 
other model in the set only in which term it uses for which coordinate curve. We can now define a 
set whose members are all co-referring model-indexed axis-terms in models M1 to Mn (there will be 
n of these sets, one for each of the n orthogonal coordinate curves). Such a set could serve as our 
case study just as well as S2 does. For example, for n=3 and T = {x, y, z}, this procedure will give us 
(among others) the set S3: {‘x-axis1’, ‘y-axis2’, ‘z-axis3’}. There is no reason why this can’t be extended 
infinitely, so that we can use this procedure to define a set with infinitely many members, all 
representing the same region of an infinite-dimensional space. For now, let’s stick with the simple 




62 And meeting any other requirements of Cartesian coordinate curves. 
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 IV.1 Criterion (A): all members of S have the same referent  
Our case study is the set S2: {‘x-axis1’, ‘y-axis2’}. Given how we defined the set, these terms already 
have all of the semantic implications of our setup. The referent of ‘x-axis1’ is some region R of the 
space R2, and the semantic content of this term includes several properties of R, like being infinitely 
long, being labeled with the term ‘x-axis’ in M1, and any other relevant properties. It is clear from how the 
case is set up that all members of S2 co-refer, since we defined this set by picking out all the terms in 
our models that refer to the region R. So our set S2 meets the first criterion, (A).  
 
 IV.2 Criterion (B): No two members of S have the same semantic content 
Do ‘x-axis1’ and ‘y-axis2’ have the same semantic content? Surely not. Part of what is included in ‘x-
axis1’ is the property being labeled with the term ‘x-axis’ in model M1. On the other hand, ‘y-axis2’ says 
nothing about M1, so it does not have that same semantic content. Each term in our set will include 
a non-sparse property involving its own model and not any of the others. This ensures that no two 
terms will have identical semantic content in this set. The same will be true if we construct a set for a 
higher-dimensional space, as per the generalized procedure above.  
 
 IV.3 Criterion (C): Any two members of S include all the same sparse properties  
Given how we defined these sets and terms, we can easily see that no sparse properties will be 
included in ‘x-axis1’ but not ‘y-axis2’. The only difference between these two terms is that one says 
that the region has a certain name in model M1, and the other that it has a different name in model 
M2. These are facts about how some model represents the region; they are not sparse properties of 
the region itself. This is an uncontroversial case of non-sparse properties of the form being represented 
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as X by Y. The only thing ‘x-axis1’ says of its referent that ‘y-axis2’ does not is how M1 labels this 
region; and this is clearly a non-sparse property of the region.63 
 
IV.4 Criterion (D): There is some metaphysically significant property F and some number n such that S’s 
cardinality is equal to n iff the referent of S’s members has property F. 
The question here is whether there is some metaphysically significant property R has iff the set S2 
has a certain cardinality. We can clearly see that this is the case, based on our generalized procedure 
for defining sets like S2. This set would have had three members if their referent R were a region of a 
3D space; four members if R were a region of a 4D space; and so on to infinity. Given that S2 has 
two members, it follows that the referent of those members is a region of a 2D space; and given that 
the referent of these members is a region of a 2D space, it follows that S2 has two members.  
Recall my note at the end of Section III: I’m not claiming that the two-dimensionality of the 
space is grounded in or depends on the cardinality of the set S2. All we need is a one-one correlation to 
give us the right connection between the number of distinct co-referring terms and some 
metaphysically significant property of their referent. Being a region of a two-dimensional space is a 
metaphysically significant, sparse property of R;64 and R has this property iff the cardinality of the set 
S2 is equal to two.  
 
IV.5 Proof-of-concept 
We have now defined a set of terms, S2, meeting criteria A-D. We’ve also found a procedure by 
which we can define sets that meet these criteria for a space with any number of dimensions. This is 
 
63 This might be a sparse property of the model M1; but that is perfectly consistent with our four criteria. 
64 See footnote 60. 
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sufficient to serve as the proof-of-concept we need to show that a semantic account can 
accommodate Spinoza’s definition of absolute infinity, which the syntactic account could not do. To 
see why that is, remember that Lin’s objection to the semantic view was that it required property 
pluralism. We can now see that a set of terms can meet the right criteria to avoid robust property 
pluralism (the only kind incompatible with Spinoza’s system) while still maintaining that the number 
of distinct co-referring terms indicates some sparse property of their referent. For a set of terms to 
meet these criteria, they must differ in semantic content; but it is not necessary that they include 
distinct sparse properties, as the case study of dimension-terms shows.  
We can carry this lesson back to our interpretation of Spinoza. Absolute infinity is a sparse 
property, the single property with which Spinoza defines God, and instantiating this property 
consists in having infinitely many attributes. Having infinitely many attributes requires there being 
infinitely many distinct co-referring attribute-terms. This means there is a correlation between being 
absolutely infinite and being referred to with infinitely many attribute-terms. This can only be 
accommodated if attribute-term counterparts differ in semantic content. I see no way to construct a 
set of terms meeting these criteria if the terms have identical semantic content.  
Neither direction of this correlation is easy to account for on a syntactic view. What kind of 
property F could there be such that if some X is F, then there are infinitely many syntactically-
distinct terms referring to X?65 The other direction is even harder to account for: what sparse 
property F could be such that an entity instantiates F only if there are infinitely many merely-
syntactically-distinct terms referring to it? The difference between an entity with infinitely many 
languages referring to it and an entity without infinitely many languages referring to it is not a 
 
65 Lin’s response to a different objection suggests he might think the property of having infinite reality might do 
the job here; he claims this property entails that as many things as possible follow from the substance, 
including quantity of syntactic guises. I am not convinced this account works; but in any case it is the other 
direction of the biconditional that is most pressing for Lin’s account.  
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difference in the entity, but a difference in the languages. Most importantly, the case study shows 
that a semantic view can accommodate this correlation even when the terms include all the same 
sparse properties. The semantic view thus has a way around Lin’s objection, while still doing better 
than Lin’s own view on the definition of absolute infinity.  
 
Conclusion 
We have now seen that it is possible for a set of terms to meet the criteria I set out in Section III for 
attribute-terms under a semantic interpretation without robust property pluralism. This is made 
possible by the fact that these terms differ in semantic content, even though there is no difference in 
the sparse properties they include. It remains to be seen how the same can be accomplished with 
Spinoza’s attribute-terms rather than dimension-terms. But this gives us a clear, precise model on 
which we can see how to accomplish this task. The same is not true for the syntactic account: there 
is no clear path to explaining the definition of absolute infinity on that view. 
 We can now stand back and take stock of what we’ve seen from the comparison of these 
two variants of the linguistic approach. The semantic account can explain the definition of absolute 
infinity; the syntactic account cannot. The semantic account can even accomplish this without 
requiring robust property pluralism, which was the primary objection Lin presented against it. Given 
that the semantic account was always the most straight-forward version of the linguistic approach, 
this gives us strong reason to support it. In his letter to De Vries, Spinoza compares attribute-terms 
to two other cases of semantically distinct terms – he even gives descriptions clarifying how the co-
referring terms differ in meaning in his two cases.66 Spinoza never says that attribute-terms 
constitute merely distinct languages. As someone who spoke multiple languages fluently and wrote a 
 
66 In the case of the third patriarch, one term includes the fact that he grabbed his twin’s foot as they were 
born, and the other doesn’t. In the case of the shape and color of a surface, one term includes a relation 
between the surface and an observer, and the other doesn’t.  
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treatise on grammar,67 this seems like an easy thing for him to mention if it were his view. Once 
Lin’s objection is undermined, the evidence points strongly towards the semantic view. 
 If we are interested in the semantics of attribute-terms as a way to understand the 
metaphysics of attributes, we should make sure we account for the differences in semantic content 
between attribute-term counterparts. This means ‘my mind’ means something different than ‘my 
body’. But this doesn’t mean there is a corresponding metaphysically significant property 
differentiating my mind from my body. As implied by the example of dimension-terms, the 
connection between the metaphysics and semantics is more complicated here. Whatever this 
connection turns out to be, it can’t be captured by the notion of merely syntactically distinct 
languages. The better variant of the linguistic approach is the semantic view, not the syntactic one. 
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